MAJOR EXAM #5 (Final Exam) is based on chapter 14 (Unjust Wars & professional Obligations) and chapter 15 (the Role of the United Nations). PLEASE be sure that you have carefully reviewed these 2 chapters before you take this exam. In this exam you are to answer separately (thoroughly and thoughtfully) each question asked in each number. Be sure to answer each question in complete sentences (not fragments). Be sure to proofread your answer for clarity, coherence and correctness in grammar, spelling, punctuation mark, etc. Make sure that you label or identify each part of your answer (for example, #1A, 1B, 1C, etc.). Please do not lump together your answers. Your answer must be word-processed, double-spaced, using 10-12 font size and number the pages of exam. If you quote a passage from the reading to support your answer to a question you need to cite reference (using parenthetical citation) for that passage you are quoting from the reading.If you do not submit your final exam to Safe Assign your final exam will receive an automatic deduction of 25 points even before I read and grade it. So that you will be able to submit your final exam to Safe Assign, you must make sure that you submit it by the due date for this final exam. Please note that you get only ONE ATTEMPT to submit your final exam to Safe Assign. NOTE: In your answer to the final exam questions, please do not include the questions asked because that will automatically trigger a Safe Assign match that will cause your exam to exceed the 25% acceptable limit.1. State clearly the view of the secretary of defense during the early years of Vietnam,
Robert McNamara, about the Vietnam war. What does this view of McNamara mean
to the U.S. military profession? Are professional soldiers culpable for fighting in a
war that the secretary of defense believed to be unjust? Should military leaders resign
their commissions if they believe a war to be unjust? (10 points)
2. What does the concept of civilian control of the military mean (at least in the context
of the United States)? Explain everything that this concept entails. (10 points)
3. Explain all the legal stipulations implicit in the military subordination to political
authority (at least in the context of the United States). (10 points) 4. Regarding the issue of military officership, 1st, explain clearly what being a member
of a profession means; and 2nd, explain clearly everything that military officership
entails. (10 points) 5. Is there ever a scenario where the United States (acting either unilaterally or in
conjunction with the United Nations) can forcibly intervene in the internal affairs of
another sovereign country for humanitarian purpose? Explain fully you answer. (10
points)
6. What is the long-standing presumption in the international community against states
interfering in each other’s internal affairs? State the various articles in the United
States Charter that reflect this presumption. (10 points) 7. What is the common factor in all cases of humanitarian intervention? What are the
humanitarian reasons for such intervention? In the case of the United Nations’
intervention in Somalia in 1993, what are the human rights violations that nations
cited for humanitarian intervention? (10 points)
8. Explain at least 3 external interventions that do not quality as humanitarian
interventions. (NOTE: You need to explain here why each of these 3 external
interventions does not qualify as humanitarian intervention (10 points). 9. Explain the view of Ellen Fey-Wouters about humanitarian intervention. What would
be your own view on the so-called “crimes against humanity”? (10 points).
10. Explain fully each of the objective criteria would warrant overriding the principle of
non-intervention. (10 points)
chapter_14___unjust_wars___professional_obligations___summary.pptx
chapter_15___summary___role_of_the_un.pptx
Unformatted Attachment Preview
UNJUST WARS AND
PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER 14 SUMMARY
UNJUST WARS AND PROFESSIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
• The secretary of defense during the early years of
Vietnam, Robert McNamara, stated that he was
convinced—fully seven years before the war
ended—that the Vietnam war was both
unwinnable and that the U.S. should withdraw.
• The secretary of defense believed that the U.S. was
fighting an unjust war.
• Had the U.S. government acted on McNamara’s
assessment at that time, thousands of soldiers and
Vietnamese soldiers and civilians might still be alive
today.
UNJUST WARS AND PROFESSIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
• What does McNamara’s case mean
for the U.S. military profession?
• Are professional soldiers culpable for
fighting in a war that the secretary
of defense believed to be unjust?
• Should military leaders resign their
commissions if they believe a war to
be unjust?
UNJUST WARS AND PROFESSIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
• Our long-standing tradition of civilian
control of the military meant that soldiers
go where and when they are told to go,
provided that the telling is done by
legally elected officials imbued with the
power to make such decisions.
• But some have argued that no person
can end or cancel their moral agency,
and that military officers should refuse to
obey immoral orders. (p. 238)
UNJUST WARS AND PROFESSIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
• Paul Christopher (the author of our text)
believes the long-held position on the
topic of whether soldiers are morally
obligated to fight wars they believe are
unjust is dead right.
• Christopher justifies his position in this
chapter.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
RESPONSIBILITIES
• Soldiers are only praised or blamed for how
they fight in a war—for military virtues such
as courage, honor, and loyalty—rather than
the justness of the war itself.
• Shakespeare illustrates this idea in his
dramatic account of the Battle of
Agincourt, where a soldier states that if the
war they are fighting is unjust—if the cause
for the war is a wrong cause—the crime falls
on the king, not on them as soldiers.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
RESPONSIBILITIES
• As we’ve seen civilized nations have since
antiquity made a distinction and recognized a
logical separation between jus ad bellum (the
justice of wars) and jus in bello (justice in war).
• According to the Just War Tradition, decisions
regarding whether force should be used to
achieve political objectives are always political
decisions.
• While decisions concerning how that force is
employed—the actual conduct of war—are
the responsibility of the professional soldier.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
RESPONSIBILITIES
• The question at hand—whether a
war is just or unjust—concerns the
concept of jus ad bellum, i.e.,
decisions concerning going to war.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• The concept of civilian control of the
military is fundamental to the U.S.
political system.
• Army Field Manual 100-5 identifies
“Proper subordination to political
authority” (p.239)
• However, this doesn’t mean civilians,
such as the secretary of defense, tell
military professionals how to fight.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• Only members of the military profession
are competent to make decisions
regarding how to fight, train, interrogate
prisoners, treat civilian refugees, etc.
• Deciding about the conduct of war falls
under jus in bello, justice in war, and such
decisions are the responsibility of military
professionals.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• Subordination of the military to
political authority means that
the responsibility and authority
for going to war rests with the
political leadership.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• This notion places limits on the military:
• For example, soldiers cannot make decisions
regarding either going to war or negotiating peace
without the authority of their political constituency.
• Such actions would be morally and legally wrong.
• Thus, Plato noted generals who go to war or negotiate
peace without the approval of the political establishment
should be executed.
• Military professionals cannot refuse to go to war
when the political establishment orders them to do
so.
• This would also be legally and morally wrong.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• In some countries, the distinction between political
and military decision making is considered so
important that soldiers are not allowed to vote.
• In the U.S. military persons on active duty can vote
because they are considered citizen soldiers—but
they are prohibited by law from being politically
active.
• This was the reason General Douglas MacArthur was
relieved, after making public pronouncements concerning
the Korean War’s political objective.
• General Norman Schwartzkopf made similar ill-advised
comments to the media, lamenting the U.N./U.S. decision
not to invade Iraq, and later retracted these comments.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• Another example is that of Air Force General
Mike Dugan, who was relieved as the Air Force
Chief of Staff after making public statements
about U.S. political objectives that he had
established for his forces. (p.239-240)
• Military leaders may privately make
recommendations to the national leadership
when they are asked for them, but they are
prohibited from establishing or publicly
influencing political objectives.
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
• Even resignation is limited when decisions on
the use of force are at issue.
• A military officer’s resignation when called
to arms would constitute a public statement
about that officer’s assessment of the
political objectives.
• Just as officers should not fight when the
president decides against the use of force,
they should not refuse to fight when the
president orders them to do so.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• Another consideration for understanding military
subordination to political authority is the legal
stipulation that soldiers be immune from the crime
of war.
• Soldiers are imbued with invincible ignorance, as
philosopher Vitoria tells us.
• Soldiers who fight in an unjust war are protected
from prosecution.
• That is why only few senior German military leaders who
were actively involved in political decision making were
charged with crimes against peace in the International
Tribunal at Nuremberg.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• The fact is that we often never know
objectively and with any degree of certainty
which side in a war is just.
• In domestic society we choose to abide by a
system of formal justice, recognizing that ideal
or objective justice often is impossible to
achieve.
• This system of accepting formal justice should
be applied similarly to professional soldiers
and their approach to jus ad bellum issues.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• For example, when evidence is
presented in a trial, a judge or jury
deliberates and reaches a verdict of
guilty or innocent.
• In many cases we will never know for
certain whether the accused committed
the crime, but our society accepts the
verdict of the jury as long as the proper
formal procedures are followed.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• We believe that this method is the most
likely to give justice.
• We also regard adherence to the formal
process to be so important and
inviolable, that when someone doesn’t
follow the proper formal procedures,
even in obvious cases of guilt, charges
are dismissed and convictions are
overturned.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• Analogously, when Congress follows proper
constitutional procedures and decides
either to use force for political objectives, or
to refrain from doing so, this decision is
formally just.
• If it was morally permissible for officers to be
able to make individual assessments about
following Congress’ orders, then it would be
morally permissible for soldiers of all ranks
too.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• That would lead to two unsatisfactory conclusions:
1. Soldiers can leave the military service whenever
they do not agree with a political decision.
• This makes a mockery of the very notion of
having a standing army.
2. Acknowledge that requiring soldiers to fight a
war against their will is immoral, but make such a
political decision legally binding on them
anyway.
• This makes mockery of our legal system.
FORMALLY JUST WARS
• Christopher argues, “When the
American people hire, train, equip,
and support a professional officer
corps, they expect them to be
responsive to an elected authority
regarding when they should do the job
for which they have been hired,
trained, and equipped.” (p.241)
MILITARY OFFICERSHIP: PROFESSION
OR VOCATION?
• Being a member of a profession means
having a deep commitment to a set of
abstract values and principles that
define the profession.
• Hence, members of a profession
accept certain values that are specific
to their profession as being more
fundamental than others.
MILITARY OFFICERSHIP: PROFESSION
OR VOCATION?
• Military officership entails commitment to a set of
principles.
• This is reflected in the oath of office taken by military
professionals in the profession of arms, swearing to
support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
• This constitutes an agreement to abide by political
authority for all jus ad bellum decisions.
• A refusal to go when called upon constitutes an
abandonment of the oath of office, and it is a
betrayal of the national trust.
THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
CHAPTER 15 SUMMARY
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
• Neither peacekeeping nor humanitarian
missions are just causes for using armed
forces.
• To be a just cause, an injury must be
received.
• Hence, force is employed by a third party
on behalf of others who received injury,
not by those injured themselves.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
• In this chapter we examine the legal and
moral implications of humanitarian
intervention.
• When (if ever) should the United States—
acting either unilaterally or in conjunction
with the United Nations—forcibly
intervene in the internal affairs of another
sovereign nation-state for humanitarian
purposes?
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
• First, we will discuss the relationship between the
moral and legal aspects of humanitarian
interventions, and distinguish humanitarian
intervention from other types of international
interference, such as peacemaking.
• Then, we will examine the relevant moral principles
that underlie customary practices and the formal
legal framework.
• Lastly, we will sketch a criteria based on jus ad
bellum that nations considering the use of military
forces for humanitarian missions may use.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• There is a strong, long-standing presumption in the
international community against states interfering in
each other’s internal affairs.
• This presumption is reflected on certain articles of
the United States Charter:
• Article 2(7) prohibits U.N. intervention in domestic affairs of
any states, and guarantees that states will not be subjected
to U.N. “settlements” concerning domestic issues.
• Article 2(4) requires that all members refrain from “the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.” (p.244)
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• Chapter VII (Art. 42) permits the Security Council to
“take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
• Domestic issues fall outside this provision.
• Article 51 of Chapter VII presents the only apparent
just cause for the unilateral use of armed forces,
stating to have a fixed “inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense” in the case of an armed
attack.
• Protection of nationals abroad and property interests is
generally considered to fall under this self-defense.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• The absolute nature of the prohibition
against humanitarian intervention is
clearly articulated in the U.N. Charter.
• Nations should never forcibly intervene in
the internal domestic affairs of other
nations in the international community.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• International law is composed of both
positive law and customary law.
• Positive law as codified in the U.N.
Charter and international treaties.
• Customary law based on historical
precedents and accepted practices.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• In his classic, The Law of Peace and War, Hugo
Grotius lists humanitarian intervention as one of the
just causes of war. He states that kings “have the
right of demanding punishments” for injuries
committed directly against them, and also for
injuries that are not directly against them but that
excessively violate international law.
• Grotius also states that, despite the controversy of
whether there may be a just cause for a nation to
undertake war on behalf of another nation, if there
is an obvious wrong being committed, then the
international “human society” may correct it.
(p.244-5)
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• Examples of just causes for humanitarian
intervention, according to Grotius, are
cannibalism, piracy, abuse of the elderly,
rape, and castration of male subjects.
• Grotius concludes that retributive wars
are suspect of being unjust, unless the
crimes are atrocious and evident.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• John Stuart Mill allows limited exceptions in his
classic defense of nonintervention.
• Oppenheim’s classic, International Law, states
intervention in the interest of humanity is legally
permissible when a nation is guilty of cruelties
against its citizens, when it prosecutes them and
denies them fundamental human rights. (p. 245)
• Oppenheim reconciles the historical precedent
with the more recent U.N. Charter by forbidding
unilateral action but permitting intervention
undertaken by the U.N.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• Historical legal documents, the Just War Tradition,
but even more so, recent practices, present a
strong argument that the U.S. Charter’s prohibitions
against intervention is not the last word on this topic.
• There have been numerous cases of nations acting
unilaterally or regionally, deploying military units to
foreign soil using “humanitarian reasons” as a
justification:




India’s excursion into Pakistan
Zimbabwe’s action in Uganda
Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia
U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and
Panama
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• An accredited example of humanitarian
intervention is the U.N. intervention in Somalia in
1993.
• Human rights violations that nations have cited for
humanitarian interventions include:






The protection of refugees
The prevention of genocide
The protection of nationals abroad
The safeguarding of democracy
The stabilization of civil unrest
Other variations of human right violations
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• We must take care to distinguish
humanitarian intervention from other
types of external intervention, such as
peacekeeping.
• Our discussion of humanitarian
intervention shall only include those cases
when a nation(s) uses armed force to
intervene in the internal affairs of another
nation for humanitarian reasons.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• These humanitarian reasons might
include:
• Disaster relief
• Protection of refugees
• Prevention of genocide
• Curtailment of human rights violations
• Other forms of suffering, whether
inflicted intentionally or by natural
causes
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• The common factor in all cases of
humanitarian intervention is that the
intervening nation(s) uses its armed forces in
a coercive role to cause some effect in the
internal affairs of another nation, and after
this humanitarian objective is achieved, the
intervening force withdraws. (p.246)
• It doesn’t matter whether the intervening
nation(s) actually uses force but simply that
it uses armed force in a coercive role.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• External interventions that do not
qualify as humanitarian interventions:
• Humanitarian aid
• The protection of nationals abroad
• Peacekeeping
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• Humanitarian aid does not qualify as a
humanitarian intervention because of the absence
of coercive force.
• The protection of nationals abroad is more properly
classified as an issue of self-defense
• Peacekeeping is not expressly forbidden under the
U.N. Charter and should rightfully be considered in a
separate category from humanitarian intervention,
because it does not conflict with the principle of
national sovereignty.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• A recent intervention by the U.S. in Haiti in
September 1994 illustrates the important but fine
distinction between peacekeeping and
humanitarian intervention.
• President Clinton ordered elements of U.S forces to
prepare for an “assault” into Haiti, while a
delegation was in Haiti attempting to persuade
Haitian leaders to sign an agreement “inviting” U.S.
forces into their nation.
• Such an agreement would ensure that any military
action by the U.S. would fall under the rubric of
peacekeeping rather than humanitarian
intervention.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• If no agreement was reached between the U.S.
and Haitian leaders inviting U.S. forces, reports of
extensive heinous humanitarian abuses would be
used to constitute sufficient cause for humanitarian
intervention.
• The U.S.’ interventional actions fell under
humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping
intervention, depending on how the U.S. forces
entered and were employed in Haiti—by force or
by invitation.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• There is no clearly stated policy or guidelines for
when, if ever, humanitarian intervention is
permissible (or even morally obligatory).
• This is why the national debate in the U.S.
concerning intervention in Haiti, as well as Somalia
and the former Yugoslavia, focused primarily on
self-interest and cost to the U.S., with limited
consideration given to questions of morality or
justice.
• International law renders itself practically useless for
the adjudication of such questions.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• Although President Clinton promised U.S.
allies a Presidential Decision Directive
specifying conditions for U.S. involvement in
U.N. peacekeeping mission, and the U.S.
Army has recently written Field Manual 10023, Peace Operations, there are no plans for
developing similar set of guidelines for
humanitarian interventions.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• A way to reconcile the gap between accepted
practices and positive law as found in the U.N.
Charter is to argue that humanitarian intervention is
always legally prohibited but sometimes morally
permissible.
• Ellen Frey-Wouters argues humanitarian
“intervention must be considered a violation of
existing international law.” Though there may be
extreme and unique cases where “forceful
international intervention” may be necessary (e.g.
genocide), “international law need not authorize or
encourage” such an intervention. (p.247)
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• Hence, Frey-Wouters argues we should
accept the façade that humanitarian
intervention is illegal—absolutely forbidden
by the U.N. Charter—but nevertheless we
should condone it in cases where it is
morally appropriate. (p.248)
• Clearly, the law in this case is not in
agreement with our moral sensibilities; our
legal and moral rules are at odds.
THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS
• If we accept that the prohibition against

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